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Abstract
Both classical social psychological theories and recent formal models of opinion differentia-
tion and bi-polarization assign a prominent role to negative social influence. Negative influ-
ence is defined as shifts away from the opinion of others and hypothesized to be induced by
discrepancy with or disliking of the source of influence. There is strong empirical support for
the presence of positive social influence (a shift towards the opinion of others), but evidence
that large opinion differences or disliking could trigger negative shifts is mixed. We examine
positive and negative influence with controlled exposure to opinions of other individuals in
one experiment and with opinion exchange in another study. Results confirm that similari-
ties induce attraction, but results do not support that discrepancy or disliking entails nega-
tive influence. Instead, our findings suggest a robust positive linear relationship between
opinion distance and opinion shifts.
Introduction
Social influence is a powerful force that fosters opinion convergence in groups [1–4]. People
assimilate their views to real or perceived opinions of others [5–9]. Repeated social influence in
groups, organizations, and societies should, therefore, result in a gradual decrease in opinion
variance. In fact, mathematical models demonstrated that when people consistently move their
opinions closer to the opinions of those they interact with, perfect opinion consensus is inevita-
ble, unless some subset of group members is entirely cut off from interaction [10–16]. This has
left social scientists studying social influence with a theoretical puzzle of why there is persistent
opinion diversity in the presence of permanent social influence [9, 12, 17].
Neither small groups, organizations, neighborhoods, or society at large exhibit an inevitable
tendency towards perfect consensus, as examples from group discussion experiments as well as
studies of political, social and cultural views demonstrate [18–23]. Studies of college dormito-
ries [24], international work teams [25], and representative opinion surveys on controversial
issues in the public debate [26–28] even demonstrated that influence dynamics sometimes
result in gradually increasing dissimilarity and bi-polarization [29].
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Researchers have proposed the negative influence hypothesis as a possible explanation.
Under certain conditions individuals adjust their opinions in such a way as to become more
dissimilar to others they disagree with [9]. Here, we report results from two experiments that
tested whether large opinion distance could indeed trigger opinion shifts away from the source.
Formal models of opinion dynamics have demonstrated that with this type of negative influ-
ence assumed, one can reconcile social influence with the observation of persisting and some-
times even increasing opinion variation in a population [9, 19, 30–37]. Balance theory [38],
cognitive dissonance theory [39], and social judgment theory [40] have been used to justify
that positive and negative social influence must be differentiated, assuming that people strive
for agreement with a person who is similar and for disagreement with persons who are distant.
To date, however, empirical research has not provided unequivocal empirical support for
this negative influence hypothesis, despite its prominent role in the social psychology literature
[41]. Some experimental support for the negative influence assumption comes from studies
based on self-categorization theory [42] that tested whether exposure to perceived out-group
opinions may increase opinion differences between in- and out-group opinions. Furthermore,
studies that supported the negative influence hypothesis have been criticized for various short-
comings [29, 41]. First, some existing designs did not separate positive influence from the in-
group and negative influence from the out-group in the explanation of opinion shifts [42–44].
In these studies, participants were exposed to opposing opinions of out-group members and
opinions of in-group members that were similar to the opinion of the target participant but
more extreme. Participants did shift opinions away from the opinion of the out-group [45], but
it is not clear whether these were caused by negative influence from the out-group or positive
influence from more extreme in-group members. Second, studies where initial dissimilarity
was measured as perceived distance do not allow concluding whether observed opinion shifts
resulted from opinion dissimilarity or from disliking arising from perceived differences on
other dimensions [45–46]. Third, field experiments that extended over a longer time span did
not control for general opinion trends that occurred in parallel with the shifts induced by
the experimental manipulation [47–48]. Finally, existing designs cannot readily disentangle
whether shifts away from a source of influence may be induced by perceived dissimilarity to
the source, or by disliking of a negatively perceived source, as suggested by [49].
The lack of conclusive evidence for assessing the negative influence hypothesis and the
shortcomings of earlier studies provided the motivation for our two laboratory experiments.
We designed experiments that differed in several ways from existing designs. We avoided
group terminology, never revealed salient characteristics of the source of influence, and investi-
gated opinion shifts in a single opinion dimension, as these factors might complicate the rela-
tionship between discrepancy and opinion shifts directly or via attraction towards the source
[42–46, 48–51].
Most importantly, however, we studied influence in a highly controlled environment that
allowed us to differentiate between the confounding effects of attraction and opinion similarity.
In Study 1, wemeasured attraction towards the source purely based on opinion differences. We
conceptualized attraction as likeability and measured it on a positive scale from 0 to 100, where
zero was labeled as “very much disliking” and one-hundred as “very much liking”. By the
exclusion of other factors that might influence attraction, we tested how initial opinion differ-
ences cause opinion shifts. In Study 2, wemanipulated the degree to which participants liked
or disliked the source of influence, to test whether attraction confounds with effects of initial
opinion differences on opinion shifts. In both studies, we measured opinions on a 0. . .100 scale
such that both the direction and magnitude of opinion change could be assessed. In addition,
both studies were designed to avoid potential shortcomings of previous research and had the
following core design features. First, participants were informed about the opinion of only one
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other participant of the experiment at a time, to assure that opinion shifts were not caused by
multiple and potentially conflicting sources of influence. Second, to be able to statistically con-
trol for general trends in opinions, we measured participants’ opinions before and after being
exposed to the opinions of others without any intermediate exposure to other sources of influ-
ence. Third, the experiments were designed to avoid that participants would perceive the situa-
tion in inter-group terms. Fourth, participants could not themselves select the source of
influence and were placed in a highly controlled setting. Participants were aware that their
financial compensation was not based on their responses. In this way, alternative explanations
of influence and attraction dynamics that are based on financial motives, on need for consen-
sus, on endogenous interaction dynamics, on argumentation, on persuasive power, on source
credibility [50–51], or on perceived threat could be excluded.
Hypotheses
Positive shifts
The left panel of Fig 1 illustrates our hypotheses about the effect of opinion discrepancy, opera-
tionalized as initial distance to the opinion of the source on the direction and magnitude of the
resulting opinion shift on the given issue. The linear positive influence hypothesis predicts that
individuals always decrease differences between their own opinion and the opinion of the
source of influence. A positive opinion shift that is linear in the original opinion-distance cor-
responds to the earliest and simplest formal models of social influence [10, 13–14] and follows
from the assumption that individual opinions are updated as a weighted average of the opin-
ions of relevant others. The larger the previous distance to the source, the larger is the absolute
shift towards the opinion of the source. The linear positive influence hypothesis is illustrated
by the linear solid line in the left panel of Fig 1.
The linear positive influence hypothesis has been criticized for assuming that opinion shifts
are the strongest when individuals completely disagree. Alternatively, it has been proposed that
influence is weak when the discrepancy between the opinions is large, either because of lack of
interest or insuperable distance in communicating the position [51]. The notion that positive
influence is limited when initial differences are big on the given issue is represented by the
moderated positive influence hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts an inverted U-shaped effect
of initial opinion distance on the magnitude of positive opinion shift towards the source (see
Fig 1). Predicted opinion shifts are small when the individual strongly disagrees with the
source. Furthermore, predicted opinion shifts are also small in magnitude when opinion differ-
ences are small, because small differences logically exclude large shifts towards the source.
Expected shifts are biggest when opinions differ enough to allow for a large shift towards the
source’s position, but the discrepancy is not too large to substantially weaken influence. Confir-
mation for this hypothesis could be obtained if the relationship between initial opinion dis-
tance and opinion shift is better described by the combination of a linear and quadratic
parameter rather than by a simple linear effect of distance, such that overall an inverted U-
shaped relationship is predicted (see Fig 1).
In addition, large opinion differences might decrease attraction towards the source, which
in turn might limit positive influence. In parallel, small opinion differences might trigger ten-
dencies of homophily: liking those who are similar to you and increasing the likelihood of inter-
acting with them. Four decades of research in the attraction paradigm showed that the larger
the similarity is, the larger the liking of the source [52–53]. It has also been found that attrac-
tion triggers convergence towards the opinion of the source directly or indirectly via the
increased relevance of the source [40, 48, 54–57]. Similarly, several formal models took into
account the positive reinforcing dynamics of similarity and attraction and assumed that
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positive influence is limited when individuals dislike each other or are dissimilar [19, 58–62].
In Study 2, we therefore manipulated attraction independently, allowing to separating its main
effect from the effect of opinion distance.
In order to further examine whether attraction towards the source mediates the effect of ini-
tial opinion distance on opinion shift, we also tested the underlying attraction hypothesis that
opinion similarity induces attraction towards the source of influence. Byrne’s work has in par-
ticular specified the attraction hypothesis as a linear relationship between similarity and attrac-
tion [52–53].
Negative shifts
Negative shift occurs when individuals change their opinions in a way as to increase opinion
differences with the source. Opinions might be rejected and contrasted if they are too discrep-
ant and fall into the latitude of rejection [63]. In accordance with the linear positive influence
hypothesis, the simplest theoretical possibility describes shifts away from the source as a linear
effect of opinion distance (linear negative influence hypothesis, see Fig 1).
Shifts away from the source of influence can be argued from the position of cognitive disso-
nance theory [64–65]. Individuals, it is argued, reduce dissonance created by the discrepancy of
opinions by moving their opinions away from a disliked source. Beyond a certain point, addi-
tional discrepancy between a position recommended by the source and the initial position of
the target may decrease persuasion [12, 57, 65]. Other studies have found that a dissimilar com-
municator may even evoke a “boomerang effect” [37, 66–67] where information from dissimi-
lar others causes inverted attitude change [40, 68]. Theories that link discrepancy to negative
Fig 1. Visualization of the hypotheses and observed opinion shifts during Study 1. The horizontal axis of Fig 1 shows
initial opinion distance, which—following specifications of positive and negative influence in recent formal modeling work—is
the core independent variable of our analyses. The vertical axis charts the main dependent variable, the direction and
magnitude of opinion change towards the source after the first stimulus. Positive values indicate that the participant’s opinion
shifted towards the source. Negative values represent an opinion shift away from the source. The magnitude measures in both
cases howmuch the initial opinion dissimilarity was reduced or increased by the opinion shift in absolute terms. The two grey
solid lines define the maximal positive and negative opinion shift that is possible given the initial opinion distance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157948.g001
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opinion change imply that, all other things being equal, beyond a certain critical level of opin-
ion discrepancy, more dissimilarity induces a larger shift away from the source [30, 35].
The magnitude of negative opinion shifts is logically constrained in a bounded opinion
interval. The more dissimilar opinions are, the less room is for even more dissimilarity. This
implies a nonlinear shape of negative influence, which is the mirror image of the moderated
positive influence hypothesis. Themoderated negative influence hypothesis predicts that
when the initial opinion distance increases, this induces an increasingly larger opinion shift
away from the source on the given issue if the discrepancy is low. But beyond a tipping point
generated by the interplay of increasing need of distancing and decreasing room for shifts
away from the source, more initial dissimilarity reduces the magnitude of negative opinion
shift.
None of the theories or empirical studies informing negative social influence claimed that
influence is only negative. The positive and negative influence hypothesis, therefore, combines
the two forms of influence. According to the positive and negative influence hypothesis, more
similarity induces a larger relative positive opinion shift when initial distance is relatively low
such that influence is positive but moderated by dissimilarity in this region of the distance
space. Beyond a critical level of distance, less similarity induces a negative opinion shift. This
negative shift increases first with larger discrepancy. But due to the constraints of the opinion
scales, room for negative shifts is limited when the discrepancy becomes too large. Taken
together, this generates the prediction of the wave-shaped pattern on the given issue shown in
Fig 1. This pattern can be tested with inclusion of a linear, a quadratic, and a cubic distance
term in the explanatory model.
Discrepancy could also have an effect on opinion dynamics via the mechanism of derogat-
ing the source [69]. Disliking or derogating the source evolves more likely when individuals
have a larger disagreement [70–74]. In line with this argument, in Study 2, we examine whether
attraction (disliking) moderates the effect of opinion distance on opinion shifts. As part of
checking for this moderation, we test the repulsion hypothesis, according to which opinion dis-
similarity reduces attraction towards the source of influence and leads to feelings of disliking
[71–73, 75–77].
General Method
For our experiments, we selected issues that covered a wide range of topics as we were inter-
ested in general tendencies in opinion dynamics and not in context-specific explanations. Par-
ticipants’ opinions were measured on a 101 point “percentage” scale ranging from 0% to 100%.
At the very beginning of their session, participants indicated their initial opinions on 31 issues
in Study 1 and 20 issues in Study 2. All issues as well as descriptive statistics are listed in S1
Table. We selected these issues from a list of 83 issues in pilot studies. In particular, we chose
those issues that pilot participants identified as clear and salient. Furthermore, we focused on
issues where opinion variance was high and where opinions did not strongly cluster on round
numbers. The selected issues did not have an objectively true opinion value (unlike in [5, 51])
and were topics where social-desirability effects and “cultural truism” effects [69] are unlikely.
Our attractionmeasure was adopted from Byrne’s classical work [52: 427]. That is, we asked
participants: “We would like to know your feelings about how much would you probably like
this person”. The answering scale ranged from 0 to 100, where zero was labeled as “very much
disliking” and one-hundred as “very much liking”.
The experimental design has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department
of Sociology at the University of Groningen. Informed consent in a written form has been
obtained from all participants. The data were analyzed anonymously.
Discrepancy and Opinion Shifts
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Study 1
Procedure
The experiment took place at the University of Groningen and lasted 45 minutes per session.
Participants were randomly seated in cubicles and responded to a web-based questionnaire.
They first rated their opinions on 31 issues and indicated how important they considered each
issue. Next, for every participant an issue was selected. Participants were exposed to the opin-
ion of the source on the selected issue (first stimulus). This opinion of the source was drawn
from a pilot or an earlier session, which allowed using a web-based questionnaire without real
online interactions. Further details about the procedure can be found in S1 Text. As all pre-
selected issues had a relatively high variance of opinions (S1 Table), our matching method
ensured that we obtained a wide range of opinion similarity.
After the first stimulus, we measured participants’ attraction towards the source (the other
person) and assessed their opinions a second time on the same screen. Given the lack of any
other information, participants could only base the attraction rating on the initial opinion of
the source (the first stimulus). Participants’ attraction towards the source and the difference
between the second opinion measure and the opinion at the very beginning of the experiment
constituted the two dependent variables of our analyses. Details of the measurement of the
dependent variables can be found in S2 Text.
Subsequently, participants were informed about the updated opinion of the source on the
issue (second stimulus, S1 Text), followed by another measurement of attraction and opinion
change. Here, we focus on the effects of the first stimulus. The effects of the second stimulus
were very much in line with those of the first, although the effects of the second stimulus
turned out to be weaker.
For each participant, this procedure was repeated 7 to 9 times. Each time, a new source and
a new issue was chosen. The order of issues followed an automated selection procedure that
avoided repetition and spread issues evenly across different opinion positions. This manipula-
tion created variance in opinion distance between the target and source, which is the core
independent variable of our study. At the end of the experiment, participants completed a
questionnaire asking background data and motivations during the experiment.
Participants
Participants were 108 first and second year students of sociology at the University of Gro-
ningen (in the Netherlands) who participated as study requirement. After excluding all stu-
dents from the pilot study, N = 89 participants were included in the analyses. As every
participant was exposed to multiple sources, the total number of observed opinion exchanges
was 617.
Results
Effects on opinion shifts. S1 Fig displays opinion shifts after the first stimulus on the
absolute opinion scale, while the right panel in Fig 1 illustrates how opinions shifted, depend-
ing on the initial opinion distance between the target and the source. The scatter plot shows
that there were opinion shifts that resulted in increased opinion differences. These negative
shifts, however, were observed mainly when initial opinion differences were very small and
positive shifts were hardly possible. The lowess-smoother curve fitted to the scatter plot shows
the average association between the two variables across the 617 observations. It shows that the
relationship between opinion distance and opinion shift was positive and rather linear, in line
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with the linear positive influence hypothesis. On average, the larger the initial opinion discrep-
ancy, the larger the opinion shift towards the opinion of the source.
As more careful tests, we estimated random intercept (multilevel) regression models [78–
79] with opinion change after the first stimulus as the dependent variable (see Table 1). We
estimated random intercept (multilevel) regressions, because opinions were nested in subjects.
Each participant was exposed to multiple sources in the experiment and is, thus, represented
multiple times in our dataset, which violates the assumption of standard statistical tests that
observations are independent. Our core independent variable was the initial opinion distance
between the participant and the source. We also included a quadratic term to test the U-shape
of the moderated positive influence hypothesis and the moderated negative influence hypothe-
sis. In addition, the wave-shaped pattern of our hypothesis that combines positive and negative
influence was tested by including a cubic term for initial opinion discrepancy.
In Model 1 in Table 1, the intercept is negative and significant, showing that participants
who perfectly agreed with the source shifted their opinions away from the source by 4.35 scale
points on average. This shift away from the source, however, does not support the negative
influence hypothesis, as the hypothesis predicts such shifts when individuals disagree with the
source.
What is more important, the estimate of the distance parameter is positive and significant
but the estimate of the squared distance is small and insignificant. This shows that, on average,
opinion distance increased shifts towards the source linearly, which supports the linear positive
influence hypothesis. The average opinion shifts that Model 1 of Table 1 implies are visualized
in the right panel of Fig 1.
To test the positive and negative influence hypothesis, we included a cubic distance term in
Model 2 of Table 1. This term, however, did not have a significant effect and including it failed
Table 1. Fixed Effects Estimates (Top) and Variance-Covariance Estimates (Bottom) for Models of the Predictors of Opinion Shifts after the First
Stimulus in Study 1.
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Fixed effects
Intercept -4.35** (1.32) -4.40** (1.48) -5.71* (2.53)
Level 1 (observations)
Distance 0.34 ***(0.09) 0.35* (0.18) 0.34* (0.17)
Distance2/100 -0.09 (0.14) -0.12 (0.57) -0.08 (0.56)
Distance3/10000 0.02 (0.47) -0.01 (0.47)
Importance of issue -0.79 (0.78)
Level 2 (participants)
Gender (female = 1) 1.72 (1.47)
Year of study 0.75 (0.84)
Works (yes = 1) 1.48 (1.50)
Random parameters
Intercept var. μ0 21.49*** 21.50*** 20.87***
level-1 σ2 159.94 160.21 160.21
Model deviance 4943.56 4942.02 4928.76
Notes. N = 617 observations from 89 participants. Table shows restricted maximum likelihood HLM2 model estimates obtained in HLM 6. Numbers in
parentheses are robust standard errors. For the variance of the random intercept, the p-value is obtained from a χ2-test.
* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157948.t001
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to increase model fit, as the difference in model deviance between Models 1 and 2 was not sig-
nificant (χ2(1) = 1.53, p = 0.22). Model 3 in Table 1 incorporates salience of the selected issue
for the participant, gender [80], year of study, and labor market experience as controls. These
variables did not have significant effects and failed to decrease model deviance significantly
(χ2(4) = 13.26, p = 0.9899).
In sum, Study 1 supported the linear positive influence hypothesis. The more participants
disagreed with the source, the more they were positively influenced, on average. We did not
find limitations of positive influence when participants disagreed strongly with the source.
Thus, we found no support for the moderated positive influence, the moderated negative influ-
ence, and the positive and negative influence hypotheses.
Effects on attraction. The average attraction towards the source was 61.3 (SD = 19.1) on
an attraction scale that ranged from 0 to 100, suggesting that ratings were rather positive on
average. 14.3% of the ratings, however, were below the center of the attraction scale, suggesting
negative evaluations of the source. Fig 2 shows a descriptive analysis of the association between
initial opinion discrepancy and attraction of the source. The average association of the two var-
iables is indicated by the declining quadratic function that was fitted to the data. For large ini-
tial opinion distances, the fitted line does not significantly fall below the midpoint of the
attraction scale, suggesting that even big opinion distances failed to create feelings of disliking
on average.
The random intercept (multilevel) regression models of Table 2 provide the statistical test of
the attraction and the repulsion hypotheses. In Model 1, we included only the intercept and a
linear effect of opinion distance. The intercept is significantly higher than 50, which is the mid-
point of the attraction scale. Opinion distance had a significantly negative effect on attraction.
Its parameter estimate implies that attraction falls below the midpoint of the scale when opin-
ion distance exceeds 68.3 scale points. However, as Model 2 shows and Fig 2 indicated, the
effect of opinion distance on attraction is quadratic. The combination of the significant nega-
tive linear and positive quadratic effect of initial distance indicates that attraction rates decrease
Fig 2. Relationship between initial opinion distance and attraction measured after the first stimulus in
Study 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157948.g002
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by opinion distance, but for large distances there is a slight increase. Most importantly, the esti-
mated curve stays above the neutral attraction score of 50. This pattern supports the attraction
hypothesis, but is inconsistent with the repulsion hypothesis. Including control variables did not
affect this conclusion, but revealed that female participants gave higher attraction scores on
average.
Discussion
Study 1 supported the linear positive influence hypothesis and the attraction hypothesis. It did
not support the hypotheses of negative influence or the hypothesis of moderated positive influ-
ence. We found a small differentiation effect indicating a baseline tendency to move one’s opin-
ion away from very similar opinions of others, but this tendency was combined with a linear
and positive effect of opinion-distance on opinion shifts towards the source.
Even though neither of the negative influence hypotheses was supported, the results of
Study 1 do not necessarily imply that there is no negative influence when subjects dislike the
source. Therefore, we experimentally manipulated in Study 2 participants’ attraction towards
the source.
Study 2
Procedure
The experiment took place in Groningen and lasted one hour per session. Participants were
invited in groups of 10 and were randomly seated in cubicles. They were asked about their
Table 2. Fixed Effects Estimates (Top) and Variance-Covariance Estimates (Bottom) for Models of the
Predictors of Attraction Ratings after the First Stimulus in Study 1.
Parameter Model 1 Model 2
Fixed effects
Intercept 69.81*** (1.67) 75.11*** (3.71)
Level 1(observations)
Distance -0.29*** (0.04) -0.53*** (0.11)
Distance2/100 0.33** (0.12)
Salience -1.43 (0.94)
Level 2 (participants)
Gender (female = 1) 7.30** (2.58)
Works (yes = 1) -3.72 (2.61)
Year of study -0.69 (1.19)
Random parameters
Intercept var. μ0 109.73*** 103.29***
level-1 σ2 223.98 219.74
Model deviance 5215.96 5189.04
Notes. N = 617 cases for 89 participants. Table shows restricted maximum likelihood HLM2 model
estimates obtained in HLM 6. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. The dependent variable
“attraction” was measured on a 0. . .100 scale. For the variance of the random intercept, the p-value is
obtained from a χ2-test. The improvement of model deviance between Model 2 and 1 is signiﬁcant (χ2(5) =
27, p = 0.9999).
* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157948.t002
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opinion and subjective importance attached to 20 issues at the beginning of the experiment
(S1 Table).
Study 2 was different in two ways from Study 1. First, participants interacted repeatedly in
real time with another participant so that both changes of opinion and of attraction could be
measured. New software was developed to allow real-time computer-mediated communication
between the participants in a pair. Participants were ensured that they interacted with partners
present in the laboratory, which was indeed the case. The identity of partners was never
revealed. The experiment was planned in such a way that every participant interacted nine
times with one of the other participants.
Second, we manipulated interpersonal attraction in order to induce feelings of disliking
towards the source of influence. In the disliking treatment, we used a combination of three
existing methods to induce feelings of disliking towards the source: an assessment of subject of
academic study, a regular Prisoner’s Dilemma task [47] and a choice between sending a stigma-
tizing or an overwhelmingly positive message to the interaction partner [47, 49]. In the dislik-
ing treatment, information about the partner’s choices or subject of study was displayed on the
screen if the partner had a different subject of study, defected in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, or
sent a stigmatizing message. Details of the manipulation can be found in S3 Text. In the control
treatment, we did not manipulate attraction towards the current source of influence. Like
in Study 1, participants were only informed about the opinion of their current interaction
partner.
The two treatments were implemented in a within-subject design. All participants alter-
nated between the two treatments, starting with the disliking treatment. Each interaction began
with an initial measurement of attraction towards the source. After the initial opinion of the
source was presented (first stimulus), opinion and attraction towards the source were measured
again. In addition, in both treatments, persuasive messages were exchanged (second stimulus),
and attraction and opinion were recorded again. Further details can be found in S4 Text.
Participants were matched with each other based on an algorithm that excluded issues with
insufficient variation in initial opinions, and was designed to simultaneously increase the vari-
ance of initial opinion distances across pairs, the variance of distances to the opinion of the
partner within the individual across matches, and to decrease the inequality of salience within
pairs. The iterated algorithm selected 9 issues that provided solutions for these criteria and
determined a random sequence among these issues.
Participants
Participants were students from all faculties of the University of Groningen recruited with
board advertisements, lecture announcements, and advertisements in the university newspa-
per. They were paid 8 Euros for their participation independently from their choices in the
experiment. In addition, everybody had an equal chance to win 200 Euros in a lottery. Data
from one session (N = 10) was excluded from the analysis due to missing values of the depen-
dent variable, leading to a total of N = 100 participants. 90 participants interacted 9 times with
another person of their session. Unfortunately, one experimental session was terminated
already after 4 interactions due to technical problems. In total, we included 850 interactions in
our analyses.
Results
Manipulation check. The attraction manipulation was successful in decreasing attraction.
After the first stimulus, the average attraction rating in the disliking treatment was above the
midscale value (M = 56.57, SD = 21.85), but significantly lower than in the control treatment
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(M = 60.22, SD = 20.87; t = 2.47). In the control treatment, 16.3 percent of the attraction ratings
were below the midpoint of the scale. In the disliking treatment, 26.0 percent of the ratings
were below this point. For the disliking treatment, a multilevel linear regression of initial attrac-
tion (M = 53.83, SD = 21.64) yielded estimated effects (robust standard errors in brackets) of
60.57 (1.80) (intercept)– 7.01 (1.89) (PairDefected) –6.02 (1.73) (Stigmatized)– 1.72
(1.39) (SameFaculty). Hence, only the difference in study direction failed to decrease initial
attraction. The manipulations based on behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and on the stigma-
tizing task successfully decreased average attraction towards the partner, although it is not
clear whether feelings of dislike were generated.
Effects on opinion shifts. Table 3 shows the relative frequency of positive and negative
opinion shifts in the two treatments. Despite the decreased attraction ratings in the disliking
treatment, the table shows no discernible difference in the occurrence of negative opinion shifts
between treatments (d = -0.56, t = -0.67 for the first shift, d = -0.006, t = -0.007 after all stimuli).
In Table 4, we report random intercept (multilevel) multilevel regression models of opinion
change after the first stimulus separately for the two treatments. The difference to the models
estimated for Study 1 was that we added for the disliking treatment (Models 3–6) terms that
allowed assessing the unique contribution of the independently manipulated initial attraction,
as well as its potential interaction with initial opinion discrepancy.
In the control treatment, as in Study 1, the opinion of the source was the only stimulus for
shifting an opinion. Nevertheless, while in Study 1 we only found a strong positive linear effect
of initial opinion discrepancy on the magnitude of positive opinion shift, Models 1 and 2 also
have a significant quadratic effect of opinion distance in the control treatment in Study 2. This
lends support for non-linear effects of initial discrepancy. Both Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 com-
prise significant effects of initial discrepancy (positive) as well as initial discrepancy squared
(negative). Moreover, the cubic term of initial discrepancy in Model 2 has a positive effect that
is close to being statistically significant at the p = 0.05 level.
To facilitate interpretation, the left panel of Fig 3 plots Model 1 from Table 4, showing
that the estimated curve remotely resembles the wave-shape predicted by the negative and
positive influence hypothesis. Contrary to this hypothesis we find, however, that the esti-
mated curve falls predominantly into the region of positive opinion shifts. This holds in par-
ticular for large initial opinion discrepancy, in contradiction with the negative and positive
influence hypothesis. Despite the differences with Study 1, we conclude that also the results
for the control treatment of Study 2 are well approximated by the linear positive influence
hypothesis.
Table 3. Relative Frequency of Positive, Negative, and No Opinion Shifts Observed in Study 2 after
the First Stimulus and after All Stimuli.
Control treatment Disliking treatment
After the ﬁrst stimulus
Positive shifts 34.74% 32.98%
No change 57.89% 58.30%
Negative shifts 7.37% 8.72%
After all stimuli
Positive shifts 54.21% 53.83%
No change 38.16% 36.81%
Negative shifts 7.63% 9.36%
N (100%) 380 470
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157948.t003
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Likewise, also the disliking treatment supported the linear positive influence hypothesis, as
Models 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Table 4 show. While initial opinion discrepancy had a significant and
positive effect on opinion change, the non-linear effects of initial discrepancy were not signifi-
cant. Moreover, also here the estimated curves fall predominantly into the region of positive
opinion shifts (see right panel of Fig 3). As a further test, we estimated similar models also for
the second opinion shift in the disliking treatment. Opinion shifts after the second stimulus
were far smaller than shifts after the first stimulus. This is in line with the findings of decreasing
message acceptance in persuasion research [63], but questions the assumption of constant
weights in opinion dynamics models with repeated interactions [9: 282]. The smaller shifts
after the second stimulus were in the same direction as first shifts and the impact of opinion
distance has remained linear. These results clearly demonstrate that a longer interaction is not
different qualitatively from a short influence process and it is the first impression that matters
the most.
The independent manipulation of attraction in the disliking treatment allowed us to test
whether a low attraction induced negative influence independent of the effect of opinion dis-
tance. Models 5 and 6 in Table 4 have a significant negative effect of attraction on opinion
change, which seems to contradict the hypothesis that disliking rather than liking reduces
and even inverts positive opinion shifts. The contrast with Model 4 that does not include an
Table 4. Fixed Effects Estimates (Top) and Variance-Covariance Estimates (Bottom) for Models of the Predictors of the First Opinion Shift in
Study 2.
Parameter Control treatment Disliking treatment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Fixed effects
Intercept -3.14***(0.88) -1.19 (1.77) -2.63** (0.83) -3.20 (1.64) 1.34 (1.70) -0.66 (2.16)
Level 1 (observations)
Distance 0.64***(0.19) 0.63***(0.19) 0.44**(0.14) 0.44**(0.14) 0.29*(0.13) 0.29*(0.13)
Distance2/100 -1.53*(0.75) -1.51*(0.74) -0.72 (0.49) -0.72 (0.49) -0.67 (0.46) -0.70 (0.46)
Distance3/10000 1.28 (0.71) 1.26 (0.70) 0.54 (0.42) 0.53 (0.41) 0.49 (0.38) 0.51 (0.38)
Initial attraction 0.01 (0.03) -0.07* (0.03) -0.07*(0.03)
Attraction *
distance
0.003* (0.001) 0.003* (0.001)
Salience of issue -0.20 (0.59) 0.77 (0.62)
Level 2
(participants)
Gender (female = 1) -0.82 (1.41) 1.16 (1.37)
Works (yes = 1) -0.86 (1.36) 0.52 (1.10)
MA student
(yes = 1)
-2.60*(1.28) -0.31 (1.07)
Random parameters
Intercept var. μ0 15.65*** 15.31*** 0.77 0.85 0.85 0.46
level-1 σ2 100.95 101.17 129.13 129.28 127.64 128.43
Model deviance 2882.25 2869.33 3626.23 3629.80 3636.64 3626.66
Notes. N = 380 cases in the control treatment; N = 470 cases in the disliking treatment for 100 participants in each treatment. Missing values (N = 9) for
the Works variable have been imputed by the overall mean (0.411).
* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157948.t004
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interaction effect shows that the main effect of attraction needs to be interpreted in combina-
tion with the positive interaction effect of initial discrepancy with initial attraction. This implies
that opinion shifts in case of distant and liked sources are attenuated, but when we take this
into account, liking the source implies a net differentiation effect. As an additional illustration,
Fig 4 compares the average opinion change by low, neutral, and high attraction towards the
source, broken down by small vs. large initial opinion discrepancy. Overall, average opinion
changes were positive in all categories. This pattern of results shows no indication of negative
opinion shifts induced by disliking.
Effects on attraction. We tested the attraction hypothesis and the repulsion hypothesis
with multilevel regression models of participants’ attraction towards the source (measured
after the first stimulus). We estimated models separately for the two attraction treatments. In
addition, we controlled in the regressions for initial attraction ratings. Table 5 displays the
results.
All models in Table 5 show that attraction ratings declined in initial opinion discrepancy.
The large and positive intercept terms show that on average, participants liked the source of
influence when initial discrepancy was small. Unlike in Study 1, the estimated attraction rating
of the control treatment adopted values below the neutral point of 50 when the initial opinion
distance exceeded a critical level. For maximum initial differences, predicted ratings dropped
well below the mid-point of the scale of attraction, especially after controlling for background
variables in Model 2. These results are consistent with the attraction hypothesis but also sup-
port the repulsion hypothesis.
In the disliking treatment, attraction was manipulated independently first. Initial attraction
ratings have therefore been included in the analysis (Models 3 and 4 in Table 5). It turned out
that attraction ratings determined the next measurement to a large extent. The significant posi-
tive intercept in Models 3 and 4 indicates a general tendency to evaluate the partner more posi-
tively after the first stimulus than before. Still, for large initial distances, estimated attraction
ratings were below the midscale value, supporting the repulsion hypothesis.
Fig 3. Visualization of observed opinion shifts in the control treatment and the disliking treatment of Study 2. In the
right panel, the dashed line shows model prediction for the average initial attraction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157948.g003
Discrepancy and Opinion Shifts
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0157948 June 22, 2016 13 / 21
Summary and Conclusion
The negative influence hypothesis posits that opinion discrepancy or disliking of a source of an
opinion elicits opinions shifts away from the position of the source. This hypothesis offers an
explanation why stable bi-polarization of opinions can be observed in contexts in which posi-
tive social influence should lead to opinion convergence. Despite its prominent place in the lit-
erature, the negative influence hypothesis has hitherto not been submitted to experimental
tests that provided conclusive evidence. We conducted two experimental studies in a highly
controlled computer-mediated setting, in which we varied the initial opinion distance to and
the liking or disliking of the source. With this approach we could avoid several weaknesses of
previous experimental tests. We also add to a small but growing body of literature that aims to
assess quantitatively the relationship between opinion differences, opinion change and charac-
teristics of both source and target of influence in highly controlled experiments [81–83].
The results of our experiments challenge the negative influence hypothesis. Even when low
attraction towards the source of influence was induced in Study 2, it did not trigger opinion
shifts away from the opinion of the source. The strongest and most general effect we found was
a positive linear effect of opinion distance on opinion shifts. A similar result for a social influ-
ence experiment in which subjects had to guess the right answer to a factual question has been
reported by [81]. This finding implies for models of opinion dynamics that a complex non-lin-
ear social influence function might be unnecessary to characterize the relationship between
similarity and opinion change. Our results suggest that not only for the sake of simplicity, but
also for the sake of realism, model builders should be cautioned against resorting too readily to
a more complex assumption than a simple linear influence function. This implies that exposure
might provide the largest push towards consensus in case of large initial differences.
Fig 4. Average opinion shift after the first stimulus in the disliking treatment of Study 2, broken down
by liking vs. disliking and small (below the mean of all) vs. large (above the mean of all) initial
distances. The number of cases is displayed on top of the bars. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157948.g004
Discrepancy and Opinion Shifts
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0157948 June 22, 2016 14 / 21
In fact, if negative opinion shifts occurred at all in our experiments, they did for small rather
than large distances, potentially due to random shifts or because of a need for differentiation
that some authors posited to be a driving force of social and cultural diversity [19, 84–90]. We
found no support for the negative influence hypothesis in our data. Thus, to the extent that we
can generalize this pattern towards a description of the micro-level process that drives social
influence in larger scale repeated interactions between multiple individuals, our results do not
yield an explanation of opinion polarization. It should be noted however, that models that
assume tendencies for differentiation mainly for small distances can generate persistent opin-
ion diversity—but not opinion polarization—in a larger population of interacting individuals
under certain conditions [62].
While our experiments did not provide support of negative influence, we found evidence of
another element of a possible explanation of opinion diversity, the attraction hypothesis. At the
same time, there was only mixed evidence for repulsion in our data. In Study 1 we did not find
support for the repulsion hypothesis, but in Study 2 we did. Large discrepancy induced less lik-
ing in Study 2, but contrary to theories of negative influence, this was not associated with nega-
tive opinion shifts. In short, our findings are only partly consistent with a motivation to reduce
cognitive dissonance [39, 64–65] and with predictions of social judgment theory [40]. Individ-
uals might have formed their opinions in a way to build and maintain a consistent system of
beliefs and opinions, but this was not strictly differentiated based on liking of the source. Par-
ticipants in our experiments tended to shift their opinions towards those of the source, irre-
spective of their evaluation. This might be because people in general do not easily distance
Table 5. Fixed Effects Estimates (Top) and Variance-Covariance Estimates (Bottom) for Models of the Predictors of Attraction Ratings after the
First Stimulus in Study 2.
Parameter Control treatment Disliking treatment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fixed effects
Intercept 67.88***(1.84) 70.58***(4.71) 30.49***(3.14) 35.37***(5.46)
Level 1(observations)
Distance -0.28***(0.04) -0.40***(0.11) -0.20***(0.04) -0.39**(0.13)
Distance2/100 0.17 (0.14) 0.10 (0.09)
Initial attraction 0.59***(0.04) 0.53***(0.08)
Attraction*distance 0.002 (0.002)
Salience of issue -0.79 (1.20) 0.96 (0.93)
Level 2 (participants)
Gender (female = 1) 1.77 (3.60) 1.13 (2.15)
Works (yes = 1) -3.46 (3.26) -2.61 (1.66)
MA student (yes = 1) -1.36 (3.06) -5.16**(1.56)
Random parameters
Intercept var. μ0 148.41*** 152.01*** 11.80 4.51
level-1 σ2 232.12 231.56 274.11 273.66
Model deviance 3270.89 3252.44 3993.86 3979.39
Notes. N = 360 cases in the control treatment and N = 450 cases in the disliking treatment for 100 participants in each treatment. The dependent variable
is the attraction score measured after the ﬁrst stimulus, which was the ﬁrst attraction measurement in the control treatment and the second measurement
in the disliking treatment.
* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157948.t005
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away their opinion from others, even if the other one has an extreme position or is not very
much liked. Yet a possible interpretation is that the most distant opinions were the most dis-
turbing for the participants, but they reduced dissonance only by shifting opinions towards the
position of the source, and never bymoving away from it or by derogating the source. This
might mean that despite the successful manipulations, “liking” and “disliking” in our experi-
ments were not of crucial importance for opinion formation and cognitive balance.
There are four potential limitations concerning our studies and the generalizability of our
results that point to avenues for future research. First, our participants were mainly students
who could assume targets also to be students from the same university. This implicit similarity
itself could explain the lack of discrepancy effect, particularly in Study 1. Second, the laboratory
setting with computer-mediated anonymous interaction may have suppressed the emotional
processes that induce disliking and negative influence in field settings. In case of face-to-face
encounters, visible characteristics, sexual attraction, and facial expressions would be important
variables that are difficult to measure and to control for. Our design excluded such factors on
purpose, but the cost may have been that we could not observe some of the negative influence
dynamics that might occur in field settings. We should not claim ex post, however, that our
manipulations were “too weak”. These manipulations were not weak for positive social influ-
ence as half of the participants shifted their opinions towards the source as a result of receiving
information about the opinion of their partner. The purpose of our experiment was not to
induce negative influence, but to test hypotheses in simple and standard experimental situa-
tions to which important theories building on negative influence can also be applied.
Third, our experiments focused on dyadic social influence, as earlier experiments that
exposed participants to multiple sources made it difficult to attribute opinion shifts to negative
influence. This way we minimized group identification processes on purpose. According to
theories based on social categorization, however, it may be those group identification processes
that trigger negative influence. We deliberately excluded group-identification because many of
the formal theories predicting bi-polarization based on a mix of positive and negative influence
likewise exclude group memberships. Integrating group identities in an experimental frame-
work testing negative influence is an important direction for future work.
Fourth, in roughly half of the cases, participants did not change their opinions at all and
were biased towards round numbers on the attraction scale. One potential explanation for the
lack of opinion change is “bounded confidence” [61, 91–93]. This theory suggests that large
opinion discrepancies may result in a lack of any opinion change, rather than in negative shifts.
Our data, however, does not seem to support this possibility, as the tendency to not change
opinions was most likely for the smallest distances (e.g., p = 75.2% for the first quartile of the
initial opinion distribution and p = 50.7% for the rest in Study 2, z = 6.66) and was not signifi-
cantly different between middle and large opinion distances (e.g., p = 50.5% for the second
quartile of the initial opinion distribution and p = 50.8% for third and fourth quartiles in Study
2, z = -0.06).
Furthermore, our analyses indicate that much of the variation in attraction ratings and
opinion changes is not explained by initial discrepancy or attraction. Individuals seem to vary
on how open they are to positive and negative influence and how intolerant they are for large
inconsistencies of opinions [50, 94–97]. While we tried to capture some of this variation with
individual level controls, future research could improve upon this and include measures of cor-
responding personality variables. Future research should also explore social influence on other
kinds of opinions. We focused on issues without a true opinion value but with a moderately
high salience to the participants. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that negative influence
plays a role in communication about issues, where there is a true or socially desirable answer.
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Overall, our experiments provided a highly controlled test of assumptions about negative
social influence that have a prominent place in recent models of opinion formation. We find
only very little evidence that these assumptions adequately describe the behavior of participants
in the controlled settings of our experiments. We cannot exclude that negative influence may
occur under other conditions in the laboratory or field. It would be interesting to identify the
moderating factors that might lead to conclusions different from those we draw from our artifi-
cial settings. Our findings point to the need to inspect more carefully by which mechanisms
and under what conditions negative influence is a plausible assumption.
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